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Afterword 
Living Fanon 
Lewis R. Gordon 
Temple University 
Les damnés de la terre, published in 1961, offers words of life from a dying 
man. Orated to the author’s wife Marie-Josèphe Dublé (“Josie,” as she was 
affectionately called), typist of those narrated progenies of struggle, the text 
is the meeting of body to body, so to speak, as he interrogated and reached 
out not only to Josie but also to Jean-Paul Sartre, and through him and so 
many others, to us, the contemporary readers, in our continued efforts to 
understand, to learn, and to question. On the 6th of December, shortly after 
its publication, Frantz Fanon, author of this magnificent work dubbed by the 
Black Panther Huey Newton as “the handbook of the revolution,” was dead. 
Fifty years have come to pass, and we face memorializing Fanon’s death 
while celebrating his life through commemorating the birth of his 
extraordinary text. Honoring Fanon is, however, no easy task. Fanon is, after 
all, a thinker who struck fear and indignation in the minds of many 
erstwhile critics, ranging from Hannah Arendt to Michael Walzer, not only 
because of his thought but unfortunately also because of him or, perhaps 
better, his kind thinking such thoughts. He was what he described in his first 
book, Peau noire, masques blancs (1952), as the black, the phobogenic 
projection that scares reason out when he enters a room.  Resistance to his 
thought often took the form of declaring him a prisoner of his times, locking 
him in his biography and more radically attempting to ensnare him in an 
alienated, dehumanized, and overdetermined version of his body, 
demonizing him as a harbinger of violence and hate, a paragon of 
nationalistic fervor, a lack of originality, or, worse, irrelevant, even in 
historical terms, to contemporary thought and politics. Such critics ignore 
Fanon’s counsel of making sure the tool never subordinates the man. 
There are, however, those who write and organize their understanding 
of Fanon’s thought and political practice (or praxis) otherwise.  From studies 
of his political prescience to his impact on the formation of anti-colonial, 
decolonial, and postcolonial theory and his challenges to the pretentions of 
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the human sciences, such proponents and critics produced a body of 
literature that have come to be known as Fanon Studies. In addition to the 
usual homage—hospitals, high schools, research institutes, foundations, and 
awards bearing his name—perhaps most striking is the confluence of recent 
events in Africa and the Middle East/West Asia, much of which affirms his 
continued relevance, where not only Les damnés de la terre but also L’an v de la 
révolution algérienne (1959) and the posthumous Pour la révolution africaine 
(1964) speak, unfortunately, to reneged promises as dimensions of the times.  
Along with the many forums organized in celebration and memory of this 
great and at times infamous revolutionary—ranging from special 
conferences in Cuba, Italy, Martinique, the United States, and Venezuela, 
among others—the rebellious acts of democratic participation and efforts to 
build institutions reflecting the will of the people are fitting, albeit not 
necessarily intended, tributes. Where, in today’s world, is there a place, they 
seemed to be asking, for human beings to meet with dignity and respect? 
A recurring emphasis in Fanon’s thought is on the cultivation of the 
human elements of human institutions. Agents of social change get into 
trouble, he argued, when they attempt to make the people irrelevant to the 
societies they are building. This failure, faced by much of the leadership of 
postcolonial African and Middle Eastern states, contributed in no small part 
to the eruption of what is now known as “the Arab Spring,” which one of 
our authors, Anthony Alessandrini, rightly reminds us is also “the African 
Spring,” of 2011. Such a consideration has inspired many since the critical 
assessments of postcolonial leadership were offered in Les damnés de la terre 
in 1961, across the then Third World, including their exemplars in poverty-
centers and ghettoized regions of First World nations, to the now Global 
South, whose geopolitical terrain reach, almost perversely, into destitute 
regions of Eastern Europe. The spirit of Fanon in these events unavoidably 
organizes this tribute in this special issue of The Journal of French and 
Francophone Philosophy. 
How, we may wonder, would Fanon have considered his reflections 
fifty years later? I think Anthony Alessandrini hit the proverbial nail on the 
head through identifying an often overlooked aspect of Fanon’s relation to 
his own thought: Fanon wrote hoping he was wrong, which made his 
warnings prophetic in the sense of a warning for the sake of a genuinely 
contingent future. That Fanon continues to be relevant is, given that 
aspiration, a source of disappointment. He was a prophet beseeching his 
contemporaries to take responsibility for doing otherwise with hope of such 
protestations reaching open ears. The fifty-year disregard, of willful 
ignorance, malevolence, and despair, fulfills much of the negative diagnoses 
of the political-thinking physician. Yet for Fanon, disappointments should 
not occasion resignation, for failure, as he famously contended in Peau noire, 
masques blancs, is also an opportunity: “Si le débat ne peut pas s’ouvrir sur le 
plan philosophique, c’est-à-dire de l’exigence fondamentale de la réalité humaine, je 
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consens à le mener sur celui de la psychanalyse, c’est-à-dire des «ratés », au sens où 
l’on dit qu’un moteur a des ratés.”1 Failure, then, must paradoxically fail, which 
means to say that its success, too, is a paradox of failure. This strange 
observation holds within it the underside of failure in the being or series of 
relationships through which it could have been manifested in the first 
place—namely, human reality, here addressed, too, at psychoanalytical 
levels of anxiety and neurosis. Fanon thus, as Alessandrini also reminds us, 
had hoped to be wrong precisely because of that about which he was most 
committed to being right—that humanity is, at the most fundamental level, a 
yes, a healthy yes—what Alessandrini calls “optimism of the will.” The 
pessimistic among us would say today what was urged to many agents of 
social change, including, ironically, those such as Mohandas Gandhi and 
Martin Luther King, Jr., in addition to Fanon and, I should like to add, 
Malcolm X and Steve Bantu Biko, namely, why couldn’t they wait?  Why 
couldn’t they slow down such processes in the interest of, at least, 
“stability”?  
Although not expanded in Alessandrini’s wonderful discussion, the 
query hits the heart of the mythic core of the human generational condition. 
The conservative core, like the mythic Daedalus to Icarus, cautions against 
flying high (failing) on fashioned wings like Icarus aiming for the burning 
sun.  The father Daedalus, however, forgot that Icarus and he had taken 
flight from captivity, which meant, in the end, that the future must be faced 
even with the dangers it harbors.  Whether flying low or high, flight, in the 
end, must be taken for change to occur, and the responsibility for that, 
Fanon reminded us, cannot be understood through preserved captivity, 
which included, as Sonia Dayan-Hezbrun and Nigel Gibson remind us, the 
Greco-Latin pedestal of western and colonial values.  This system of values 
is the enemy of all struggles for decolonization, the effort to make concrete 
the will for liberation of the colonized people; premised on the notion that 
the colonial situation is just, its transformation becomes an assault on justice 
and thus presumed intrinsically flawed. The only acceptable conditions of 
action become those, in effect, that do not change the status quo. Thus, the 
political reality becomes one of challenging the dominant conception of 
ethics and morals and their relation to political action. Where might truth be 
found in the face of such opposition? The answer, Gibson reminds us, is 
beyond the abstract conception of the human being outside of de facto 
relations of suffering and deed—namely, the concrete embodiment of truth, 
human beings in the flesh facing, in concert with Alessandrini’s conclusion, 
the future to come. 
Yet even if the truth succeeds in pushing aside those invested in 
structures of alienation, there is the question of how to proceed from there 
and on behalf of or for the sake of whom? Fear and trembling for the future 
are, after all, from the experience of reaching for paradise but having 
plummeted into hell. Nationalism, versus national consciousness, Jane Anna 
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Gordon reminds us, has been one of the sources of such a descent. This 
insight echoes another from one of the great enemies of neoconservative and 
neoliberal political thought: Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s distinction between the 
general will (reflective understanding of legitimacy and right at the level of 
political society) and the will in general (selfish aggregates of private or 
individual wills). “Indeed,” reflects Gordon, “it was in the name of 
something akin to a submerged nation and general-will-in-the-making that 
those struggling to bring about an end to occupation charged colonial 
society with political illegitimacy,” an observation that reveals some of the 
incoherence of contemporary discussions pitting democracy against the 
concept of sovereignty as found, say, in the work of Antonio Negri and 
Michael Hardt, for what is radical democracy but an appeal, ultimately, to a 
different form of sovereignty than the version that is an object of their 
critique?  Without the legitimating underpinning of democratic reflection, 
anti-sovereignty collapses into multitudinous force. Fanon’s corrective, 
drawn from the anti-colonial perspective of engaged struggle, Gordon 
correctly stresses, “emerges only out of deliberate challenges to relations of 
subordination and alienation,” where the process of decolonization leads to 
the emergence of the postcolonial bourgeoisie, a pseudo-bourgeois group 
whose legitimacy is political without material capital, the consequence of 
which is, as Fanon famously argued, the absence of a telos, of an aim, which, 
affirming Alessandrini’s and Gibson’s reminder, leads to their being in the 
way of the nation’s future. Purpose requires more than a negative reaction. 
The hoped-for future, however, is one of affirmed human and humane 
relations, which makes the question of intersubjectivity, of the social world, 
of the human world, of a human being reaching for other human beings, one 
of a human body’s relation to other human bodies, a necessary condition to 
be addressed. Matthieu Renault has done much service for Fanon studies in 
his provocative exploration of how concerns with national liberation have, 
in this regard, erotic undercurrents. He takes on this task through an 
exploration of Fanon’s philosophical anthropology and, as he puts it, 
Fanon’s “return to race as a return to the body” (original emphases).  Racism 
offers a form of somatophobia. Tracing this understanding back to Fanon’s 
doctoral thesis, which rejects mind-body dualism through a theory of 
“bodily integration,” Renault argues that “… such a splitting takes its roots 
in what Fanon, following Freud and Jung, considers to be the crucial law of 
the process of (European) civilization: the law of dissociation of the white 
man’s psyche, between intelligence and drives, morality and instincts.”  
I must say I take issue with Renault’s formulation of Fanon as 
“Foucauldian” and also the notion that the body in a political relation 
constitutes a body politic: “What Fanon demonstrates in a kind of 
Foucauldian manner is that the body is always-already integrated in a 
political field, that it is always a body politic.” This formulation is, of course, 
from a tendency in recent political thought to refer to a variety of a-political 
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phenomena as political through use of the phrase “the politics of...,” and, 
through Foucault, with the formulation of “biopolitics,” to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concerns with social fields, of which “political field” is an addition, as well 
as Achille Mbembe’s “necropolitics.” The confusion is, however, on 
Foucault’s through to Mbembe’s part, in the collapse of rule and politics, 
where the negotiations and complex play of rule collapse into the 
mechanisms themselves.  The ghosts here are Carl Schmitt and Thomas 
Hobbes, whose mechanistic atomism makes politics the enemy of order.  
This fear brings to the fore, however, the point, understood by Arendt and 
Cassirer in their understanding of Plato’s relation to Socrates, where the 
former’s prioritizing the regulation of the polis diverges from the latter’s 
effort to live the contingencies and contradictions of life within the polis, 
where truth in opinion prevailed. “Politics of,” then, is often unclear, 
especially where the structure suggests economies of distribution and 
resources more than their political negotiation.  
Reasserting Bourdieu, “political field,” as an emanation from the 
genealogical tree of the polis, the city, and the encroached space of 
oppositions, offers, however, challenges of how intersubjective relations 
(“social fields”) could be established where flesh faces flesh. “Corps à corps,” 
roughly translated as lived-body to lived-body, is thus another way of 
referring to intersubjectivity, sociality, and the conditions of culture, albeit 
also guided, in political terms, with considerations of power and exigency. 
In this sense, national liberation becomes a form of re-embodiment, which 
harkens back to Fanon’s poignant observation, in Peau noire, masques blancs, 
of what happened to his presumed imago under a white boy’s observation of 
his being un nègre: he exploded (“J’explosai”). Reductionistic embodiment, 
which included the sexualization of colonized bodies, required a liberation 
of embodiment without Manichean separations of a rational mind from a 
sexualized body—the latter made existentially serious as the black. As 
Renault correctly urges: “What is needed is not a desexualization but much 
more a decolonization of sexuality.” The connection between sex, body-to-
body, and life leads to his insightful conclusion of political vitalism or a 
political philosophy of life, wherein violence and life are connected in their 
etymological roots, no doubt reminiscent of Nietzsche’s important reminder 
in The Birth of Tragedy that a life without suffering would be best achieved 
through not ever having lived.2  
Symbolism of life and death is pushed further in Anjali Prabhu’s 
poignant exploration of Roland Barthes’s trope of the death of the author 
through this commemorative situation of de facto death and celebrated 
legacy. The author, however, is complicated here by the rhetorical strategies 
of evocation and meta-displacement, where the Fanons of Peau noire, masques 
blancs are brought into reflection and engagement with the one of Le damnés 
de la terre. That “the author,” this particular author (Fanon), is dead while he 
lives calls for the question of how he is imagined or, in Prabhu’s words, 
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dreamed. The dream of dreaming, of the colonized and native’s dream of 
freedom from, in Fanon’s words, “entre neuf heures du soir et six heures du 
matin,” leads in the postcolonial situation of mystifying leadership.3 
Prabhu’s exploration of Fanon’s critical movements from “I” to “we” brings 
to the fore the problem of dangerous splitting, discussed so well, as we have 
seen, by Renault, in the neocolonial re-evocation of schisms the overcoming 
of which was previously attempted in the decolonial struggle. 
So we come to a close with Sonia Dayan-Hezbrun, who lived through so 
many of the historical circumstances of Fanon’s efforts in the French context, 
of the Algerian war and other struggles of liberation, in addition to their 
legacies, which Fanon was not able to witness. These include not only the 
tragic circumstances wrought by neocolonialism and the failures of 
postcolonial elites but also the emergence of the academic efforts to 
understand those events and their impact on political thought and practice.  
Contextualizing these events through the work of Edward Said, whose 
influence on academic postcolonial theory and the formation of the 
academic public intellectual, brought to the fore many of the tensions posed 
by the impact of poststructuralism, especially as articulated by Michel 
Foucault, on the last quarter of the twentieth century and the dawn of the 
twenty-first, and the decolonizing challenges posed by Fanon. A period 
marked by the rise of neoconservative and neoliberal global hegemony in 
the face of postmodern obsessions with anonymous and micro models of 
power, the devastating effect is a form of political nihilism ironically 
premised upon political excess; what can one do when everything is 
presumed powerful and, by extension, political?  Dayan-Hezbrun expresses 
a retrospective lamentation: “Cependant la trajectoire de Foucault a suivi une 
voie diamétralement opposée à celle de Fanon. En dépit de ses premiers centres 
d’intérêt (l’asile, la prison), Foucault a très vite été convaincu qu’il n’était guère 
possible de résister.” Even more problematic has been the influence of 
poststructural postcolonialism in disciplinary efforts premised upon 
liberation concerns of oppressed peoples. Particularly significant in this 
context, where Black Studies and Africana Studies, in addition to varieties of 
race and ethnic studies, were influenced by the emergence of forms of 
cultural studies heavily influenced by poststructuralism, was in some 
instances the eclipsing of liberatory discourses by epistemic and 
semiological ones and, in a strange development, forms of commodification 
of intellectual practices, where even the critique of Eurocentrism functioned 
more like an academic commodity.4 The result, then, was a regrettable, 
affirmed marginalization from the source: “Au-delà de cet eurocentrisme, 
Foucault ne conçoit pas la possibilité pour les groupes opprimés de se libérer.” Said 
understood the importance of thinking through the condition of les damnés 
without the pitfalls of presumed innocence, which brought him to Fanon, 
Dayan-Hezbrun correctly argues, as a critical reflection of his own 
responsibility.  To be part of but not fully belonging to the society whose 
self-image is under investigation—Fanon as a not-absolutely-French 
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Frenchman, Said as a not-absolutely-American Palestinian-American—
raised the value of the existential-political critique eclipsed in the 
poststructural moment, a question faced by the hybrid postcolonial 
bourgeoisie in whose hands is the fate of national consciousness: Fanon’s 
work, insists Dayan-Hezbrun, “…n’est pas seulement celle d’une théorie de la 
résistance et de la décolonisation. C’est une véritable contre-narration de la 
libération, comme le confirment les pages qu’il consacre à la bourgeoisie nationale et 
aux risques qu’elle fait courir à la révolution en cours.” Self-critique is 
meaningless without the ability to act upon it, which radicalizes the problem 
of political responsibility.  
 But to what, ultimately, does all this responsibility point? To some 
extent, Fanon’s passion, his sense of urgency, was a profound faith in 
humanity in the face of no less than the end of the world. For he knew that 
the Europe to which he referred in the famous conclusion to Les damnés de la 
terre was ultimately metaphorical. It was a dream whose greatest nightmare 
was the absence of its own necessity. Its continued production is premised 
upon the confusion of it with the world itself.  But beyond all that is the 
human held captive beneath, whose future requires “pensée neuve,” 
provided, of course, that we continue to have the good fortune of sufficient 
time. 
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